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Abstract
Division of labor is a complex phenomenon observed throughout nature.
Theoretical studies have focused either on its emergence through self-
organization mechanisms or on its adaptive consequences. We suggest that
the interaction of self-organization, which undoubtedly characterizes divi-
sion of labor in social insects, and evolution should be further explored.
We review the factors empirically shown to inﬂuence task choice. In light of
these factors, we review themost important self-organization and evolution-
ary models for division of labor and outline their advantages and limitations.
We describe ways to unify evolution and self-organization in the theoretical
study of division of labor and recent results in this area. Finally, we discuss
some benchmarks and primary challenges of this approach.
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INTRODUCTION
Division of labor is characterized by the performance of different tasks or roles by different groups
of individuals. Early economists such as AdamSmith argued that the beneﬁts of division of labor for
industrialized societies included increased efﬁciency in task performance owing to specialization
(exclusive dedication of individuals to speciﬁc tasks) and reduced costs of switching between tasks,
thereby leading to overall higher productivity (Smith 1776).
In nature, division of labor, in the broad sense of the expression, is widespread. The main
evolutionary transitions, such as those from prokaryotes to eukaryotes and from unicellular to
multicellular organisms, were accompanied by division of labor (Szathma´ry & Maynard Smith
1995). Within social groups division of labor is also common. In species with biparental care,
males and females frequently have different roles in raising the offspring. In hornbills, for example,
breeding females seal themselves in the nest, and males must feed them during this time (Kemp
& Woodcock 1995). Group hunting (e.g., Gazda et al. 2005), sentinel behavior in group foragers
such as meerkats (Manser 1999), and specialization in either predator defense or provisioning in
noisy miners (Arnold et al. 2005) are other examples of division of labor.
The most striking example of division of labor in nonhumans occurs in insect societies. We
focus on eusocial insects throughout this review owing to the abundant work in this area, although
the general principles discussed are equally relevant for other social systems. In eusocial insects,
such as honey bees, social wasps, ants, and termites, a few individuals (the queen caste) monopolize
reproduction, whereas the rest of the colony (the worker caste) performs tasks such as brood care,
nest maintenance, and foraging (Wilson 1971). The success of a colony is determined by its
workers’ ability to distribute themselves efﬁciently among tasks and to respond, as a group, to
environmental conditions (Gordon 1996, Oster & Wilson 1978).
Division of labor also occurs among sterile workers. Similar to somatic tissues in a multicel-
lular organism, workers can specialize in different tasks (Oster & Wilson 1978). Importantly, the
concept of specialization is a statistical one, reﬂecting an individual’s tendency to perform partic-
ular tasks more often than others. The strength of this tendency may vary greatly, ranging from
temporary behavioral differentiation to ﬁxed morphological differentiation in insect species that
form large societies (Robinson 1992).
Proximate analyses of division of labor generally are based on the concept of self-organization;
according to this view, division of labor is an emergent property of the interaction of individu-
als obeying simple behavioral rules (Bonabeau et al. 1997, Page & Mitchell 1998). This concept
has been supported by behavioral experiments showing that normally solitary seed-harvester ant
queens and halictine bees exhibit task specialization when forced to associate, i.e., paired individu-
als dedicated most of their time to different tasks (Fewell & Page 1999; Jeanson et al. 2005, 2008).
However, it is unlikely that such behavior would be evolutionarily stable if it occurred over many
generations under natural conditions, as the performance of costly tasks that reduce individual
ﬁtness would be counterselected. Hence, understanding the proximate mechanisms behind divi-
sion of labor is not enough; we must also take into account the evolutionary trajectories (ultimate
explanation) that selected these mechanisms.
The interplay of self-organization and evolution and the need for integration of the two per-
spectives have been recognized both inside and outside the scope of social insects (Bonabeau et al.
1997, Corning 1995, Halley & Winkler 2008, Page & Mitchell 1998, Richardson 2001, Seeley
2002). However, few models have attempted to unify these two approaches. In this review we out-
line suggestions to this end. We start by reviewing the empirical evidence on patterns of division
of labor in social insects. We then classify existing self-organization models by the factors that
create consistent individual differences in task choice in these models and summarize the most
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important evolutionary models for division of labor.We specify the reasons to integrate these self-
organization models with an evolutionary perspective and identify the different benchmarks of
evolvedmechanisms underlying division of labor. Finally, we summarize the ﬁrst insights obtained
from such an integrated perspective and discuss future avenues of research.
EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
In this sectionwe ﬁrst review the primary factors known to contribute to interindividual differences
in task choice. Then we discuss how colonies as a whole adjust to environmental changes as well
as changes in the size and structure of the workforce.
Worker Size and Morphology
Worker size andmorphology correlate with worker behavior in almost all species in which this has
been studied (e.g., Detrain & Pasteels 1991, Robinson et al. 2009a, Wilson 1980). For example,
in ants of the genus Pheidole with discrete morphological castes, the large “majors” are specialized
in carrying large prey items to the nest but rarely engage in other tasks such as brood care, which
is typically performed by the small “minors” (Mertl & Traniello 2009, Wilson 1985). It is not
too surprising that morphologically differentiated castes behave differently (although empirical
evidence indicates that behavior of such castes is ﬂexible to some extent, e.g., Detrain & Pasteels
1991). However, division of labor also occurs in the absence of suchmorphological differentiation,
and these are the most interesting cases for this review.
Genetic Variation
In species with multiply mated queens such as honey bees and leaf-cutter ants, different patrilines
differ in their tendencies to perform certain tasks (e.g., Julian & Fewell 2004, Robinson & Page
1989,Waddington et al. 2010; but see Fournier et al. 2008). Similar results were found for different
matrilines in ant species in which colonies contain several queens (Blatrix et al. 2000, Snyder 1992)
and in an experiment in which broods of several queens were mixed within a single ant colony
(Stuart & Page 1991). However, almost no information is available about whether the presence of
several patrilines or matrilines within a colony is associated with a higher degree of specialization.
Although increased within-colony genetic diversity may increase resistance to parasites (e.g., Baer
& Schmid-Hempel 1999, Tarpy 2003, Wilson-Rich et al. 2009), there is little evidence that it
leads to increased colony efﬁciency (Fournier et al. 2008, Rosset et al. 2005).
Developmental and Nutritional Factors
In many social insects, specialization strongly associated with the age of workers is observed,
a phenomenon known as age polyethism (Oster & Wilson 1978, Wilson 1971). For example,
young honey bee workers specialize in in-hive tasks and then switch to foraging later in life.
The transition from in-hive worker to forager is associated with physiological alterations, such
as changes in juvenile hormone and vitellogenin titers, that correlate with age (Robinson 1987).
Worker-worker interactions also mediate changes in hormonal titers through transference of
foraging-inhibiting substances (Huang & Robinson 1996, Leoncini et al. 2004). Nutritional state
also plays a role in behavioral differentiation and interacts with developmental hormones and the
insulin-signaling pathway (Amdam et al. 2003, Ament et al. 2008, Page & Amdam 2007, Schulz
et al. 1998).
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External factors such as temperature, light, and humidity during development may also affect
task preferences. In the ant Camponotus ruﬁpes, temperature during larval development inﬂuences
the response of individuals to thermal stimuli at the adult stage (Weidenmuller et al. 2009),
which causes interindividual differences in tendency tomove brood at certain temperatures. Other
external factors (e.g., light and humidity) remain to be investigated as sources of variation in task
preference.
Individual Experience
Individual experience inﬂuences task preference in the thelytokous (females are produced from
unfertilized eggs) ant Cerapachys biroi (Ravary et al. 2007). In individuals of the same age cohort,
foraging tendency was positively correlated with exposure to successful foraging experiences in
the past. Behavioral differentiation of individuals thus resulted from experience alone. It would be
interesting to investigate whether a similar pattern occurs in nonthelytokous species.
Interactions with the Environment
Social insect colonies have a strong ability to overcome environmental perturbations by changing
the number of workers engaged in speciﬁc tasks. In harvester ants, the number of foragers shifts
as a response to predation risk (MacKay 1982, Munger 1984) or changes in resource availability
(Gordon 1991, Schafer et al. 2006). Colonies of the ant Pheidole morrisi respond to seasonal
ﬂuctuations in food availability both by individually increasing fat storage and by increasing the
number of workers in the replete caste (Yang 2006).
In many species whole colonies readily migrate when the current nest location is damaged or
a better location is found. This complex process is similar in honey bees and several ant species
(reviewed in Visscher 2007): First, a few individuals scout for new nest sites; second, one location
is chosen through quorum sensing (Pratt 2005, Seeley &Morse 1978); and third, the whole colony
moves to the new location.
Social interactions are crucial to efﬁciently react to environmental change. Depending on
species, active workers can use chemical signals or direct physical contact to recruit inactive
workers. Contact with successfully returning foragers inﬂuences the decision of ants in the nest
to forage or not in several species (Gordon & Mehdiabadi 1999; Greene & Gordon 2003, 2007;
Robinson et al. 2009b). Foraging honey bees, upon returning to the nest, must search for food-
storer bees that unload and store the nectar collected. The time spent searching for food-storer
bees has been shown to be used by foragers to regulate foraging rates; short search times elicit
the recruitment of more foragers (Seeley & Tovey 1994). The modulation of division of labor by
worker-worker interactions thus appears to allow for efﬁcient use of the information acquired by
all workers in the colony.
Colony Size and Life Cycle
Eusocial insect colonies typically go through three different phases in their life cycle: a founding
stage in which new nests are founded by recently mated queens (and kings, in the case of termites),
an ergonomic growth stage in which the colony produces workers only and increases in size,
and a reproductive stage in which the colony produces new sexuals (males and gynes) (Oster &
Wilson 1978). The transition from ergonomic growth to reproduction is generally marked by the
attainment of a certain colony size, which varies from species to species.
In species withmorphological castes, often in the initial founding stage the queen produces only
small workers (“minims”), and as the colony grows, the average worker size increases (Ho¨lldobler
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& Wilson 1990). Throughout the lifetime of a colony, the need for some tasks, such as nest build-
ing and foraging, should drastically change, although the need for other tasks such as maintaining
temperature and humidity conditions should remain similar. In Lasius niger ants, different pro-
portions of workers are engaged in particular tasks over the growth of the colony (Mailleux et al.
2003). However, to our knowledge no empirical study has measured the extent of changes in task
need with colony growth.
Colony size has been argued to inﬂuence the complexity of social behavior and division of labor;
smaller colonies should have more generalist workers (Anderson et al. 2001, Bourke 1999, Karsai
& Wenzel 1998). For example, in the ant Rhytidoponera metallica, large colonies show pronounced
age-based division of labor whereas small colonies do not (Thomas & Elgar 2003). In the ant
Temnothorax albipennis, large colonies have larger proportions of brood-carrying specialists than
small colonies (Dornhaus et al. 2008). However, there are no differences between large and small
colonies in a standardized measure of division of labor (Dornhaus et al. 2009).
MODELS FOR SELF-ORGANIZED DIVISION OF LABOR
Self-organizationmodels attempt to explain the division of labor at the colony level by using simple
individual behavioral rules that assume neither complex cognitive abilities nor centralized control.
We classify these models into three groups on the basis of the factors underlying the emergence
of individual differences in task choice, namely, signal-response dynamics, spatial differentiation
of tasks, and social interactions.
Signal-Response Dynamics
These models assume that individuals differ in their responses to environmental signals of the
colony’s need for speciﬁc tasks. Possible signals include pheromones emitted by larvae to elicit
care fromworkers, nest temperature, or the amount of stored food.Themodels further assume that
these signals are dynamic: Signals increase in intensity in the absence of sufﬁcient task performance
and decrease with a certain level of task performance (Figure 1a).
The ﬁxed threshold models assume that each individual has thresholds for particular tasks that
are constant over time. Thresholds determine the intensity of signal needed for the individual to
respond (Bonabeau et al. 1996, 1998; Gove et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2006; Jeanson et al. 2007;
Page & Mitchell 1998). If signal intensity lies above an individual’s threshold, the individual will
perform the task. If signal intensity lies below the individual’s threshold, the individual will not
perform the task.The feedback between task performance and signal intensity allows for consistent
interindividual differences to be expressed: Individuals with lower thresholds for a task decrease
the signal for that task, thereby decreasing the probability that individuals with higher thresholds
will ever perform it. However, individuals may eventually perform tasks for which they have high
thresholds in the absence of workers with lower thresholds. Hence, both task specialization and
ﬂexibility can be emergent outcomes of the model’s dynamics.
The reinforced threshold model uses the same concept, with the difference that individual
thresholds can change owing to experience (Gautrais et al. 2002, Plowright & Plowright 1988,
Theraulaz et al. 1998). Performance of a task decreases the corresponding threshold, whereas not
performing a task results in an increase of the threshold.
The empirical support for a response threshold–like mechanism comes from studies of ther-
moregulation in bumble bees and ants inwhich different individuals consistently started to perform
thermoregulatory behaviors at different temperatures (O’Donnell & Foster 2001, Weidenmuller
2004). Thresholds likely have a genetic or developmental basis, because different morphological
www.annualreviews.org • Evolution of Division of Labor 95
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a  Signal-response dynamics
b  Spatial differentiation
c  Social interactions
Stimulus 2
Stimulus 2
Stimulus 3
Stimulus 3
k3
k2
k1
Stimulus 1
Stimulus 1
Stimulus 2Stimulus 1 Stimulus 3
Negative effect
Positive effect
Information
Figure 1
Schematic representation of the main factors contributing to interindividual variation in self-organization
models of division of labor. (a) In signal-response models, the number of active workers increases with the
amount of stimulus (increasing by k over time), and active workers reduce the stimulus level, thus decreasing
the need for more workers to become active. Intrinsic differences in workers, such as response thresholds,
are indicated by different colors. (b) Spatial differentiation of tasks (and of the associated stimuli) leads to
different individual behavior in the foraging-for-work model (drawn from information in Tofts 1993). The
local stimulus determines the number of active workers for each task (curved arrows). Task-related items are
processed and passed from one task group to another (straight arrows), which promotes the increase of
stimulus at the different locations. Workers active for different tasks are indicated in different colors. (c) In
social interaction models, the decision of workers to perform different tasks is affected not only by the
associated stimuli (solid arrows) but also by information received from other workers (dashed arrows). Workers
active for different tasks are indicated in the colors of the corresponding tasks. Idle workers are depicted in
black.
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castes as well as genetic lineages generally differ in their tendency to respond to task-associated
stimuli (Detrain & Pasteels 1991, Page et al. 1998, Pankiw et al. 1998). Ravary and coworkers
(2007) provide empirical support to the threshold reinforcement model.
Owing to our lack of knowledge about the actual dynamics of task stimuli in real colonies,
the implementation of task stimuli in signal-response models is simplistic. Many of these models
assume a linear increase in task stimulus in the absence of work and a linear decrease with the
amount of work performed on the task, but stimulus increase or decrease will almost certainly
be nonlinear in a real-world setting. The nature of tasks may also differ: Some tasks require the
maintenance of the stimulus within certain bounds (homeostatic tasks, e.g., thermoregulation),
whereas for other tasks it is adequate to keep the stimulus at the lowest level (maximizing tasks, e.g.,
foraging). The type of tasks present may inﬂuence the extent to which workers should specialize
or generalize ( Johnson 2003).
Spatial Differentiation
The foraging-for-work model (Franks & Tofts 1994, Tofts 1993) suggests that the spatial
distribution of tasks could lead to interindividual differences in behavior. In this model, tasks
are spatially distributed, similar to a production line. Individuals at each location process and
pass along items coming from an external source until the items reach the ﬁnal task in the line
(Figure 1b). This idea takes inspiration from real colonies in which individuals forage, cut up food
items, and transport them back to the colony, where ﬁnally the food items are fed to the brood.
The algorithm of task choice in the standard versions of the foraging-for-work model (Franks
& Tofts 1994, Tofts 1993) requires that individuals actively look for another task if they fail to
pass an item to the subsequent task or if they fail to receive items from the preceding task. At the
equilibrium state, workers stay in the same task for a prolonged time. By including in the model
a certain rate at which individuals are born and introduced into the workforce at the last task in
the production line (analogous to brood care) and a maximal age after which workers die, age
polyethism emerges. This is due both to the fact that younger workers displace older workers in
their task and to the assumption that tasks are spatially distributed in a sequence.
The foraging-for-work model aims to show that task choice need not be state or age dependent
for age polyethism to occur. The assumption that all workers have equal tendencies to perform
every task has encountered some criticism (Robinson et al. 1994, Traniello & Rosengaus 1997)
because much evidence has been found for both genetic and physiological correlates with task
choice (see previous section). Recent evidence also indicates that young workers are able to do
fewer tasks than older workers (Seid & Traniello 2006).
Social Interactions
Interactionmodels explore the role of social interactions as the drivingmechanism behind division
of labor. Interactions among workers lead to shifts in their behavioral state and task choice. The
models differ in the information exchanged during interactions.
Gordon et al. (1992) assume that workers, via social interactions, receive information about
tasks performed by others. By comparing the perceived task distribution with an intrinsic desired
task distribution, individuals switch tasks in the case of a mismatch between the two distributions.
As a result, an equilibrium is reached in which workers distribute themselves according to the
intrinsic task distribution.
Pacala et al. (1996) develop a model in which the proﬁtability of tasks changes with time. By
comparing the perceived proﬁtability of others with the proﬁtability of their own task, workers
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decide whether to switch to a more proﬁtable task. If proﬁtability is proportional to colony
efﬁciency, this process leads to a colony that is able to track environmental variation, thereby
maintaining an efﬁcient distribution of workers over tasks.
Other models address more speciﬁcally the division of labor between nest workers and foragers
as well as its modulation by inhibitory interactions between the two types of workers (Beshers
et al. 2001, Naug & Gadagkar 1999). These models ﬁnd that a simple social activation-inhibition
mechanism can explain the pattern of age polyethism often found in eusocial insects.
Limitations of Current Self-Organization Models
By demonstrating that emergent specialization is possible through simple mechanisms, self-
organization models serve as a proof of principle that high cognitive processes are not required
to achieve complex group behavior. However, these models typically do not consider the evolu-
tionary trajectories that may lead to division of labor. This also holds for those self-organization
models that implicitly incorporate adaptive reasoning. For example, in social interaction models,
task choice algorithms are designed to favor tasks for which there is a higher need. However, the
question of why and how individuals are endowed with an intrinsic knowledge of colony needs
is not addressed. Without a clear idea of how natural selection shaped the task choice mecha-
nism underlying a self-organization model, our understanding of self-organized division of labor
remains incomplete. Bonabeau et al. (1997, p. 191) stated: “. . .natural selection, operating on
parameters that modulate individual and colony-level properties, has certainly picked the forms
of self-organization that we see in social insects because they are adaptive or cooperative.” How-
ever, disappointingly few attempts have been made to develop realistic scenarios for how the
mechanisms underlying self-organized division of labor evolve over the course of generations.
EVOLUTIONARY MODELS OF DIVISION OF LABOR
Optimal Caste Ratios
The ﬁrst generation of evolutionary models for division of labor applied optimality principles to
understand the distribution of castes and tasks in a colony. In their classic book, Oster & Wilson
(1978) derived optimal caste ratios in a situation in whichmorphological differences inﬂuenced the
efﬁciency with which individuals could perform various tasks. They offer two primary theoretical
explanations for the observation that in social insects fewer castes than tasks exist: First, production
of a broad variety of physical castes is costly at the colony level; second, the behavioral ﬂexibility
of castes allows the colony to react more rapidly to environmental changes.
Oster & Wilson’s view of caste ratios as an adaptive trait has been challenged by empirical
studies that consistently fail to ﬁnd correlations between colony productivity and caste ratios (for
a review see Schmid-Hempel 1992). The behavioral ﬂexibility of workers is considered to be the
main factor responsible for adjustment of the worker force to changing environments, including
different ratios of morphological or age castes (Gordon 1996). Nevertheless, the question still
remains of whether the existence of different morphological castes actually increases ﬁtness and,
if so, why morphological castes are not found more often.
Adaptive Specialization
Any form of specialization may be beneﬁcial for two reasons (Smith 1776): First, it may allow for
higher individual efﬁciency (e.g., owing to training or through gains in task-speciﬁc information);
second, specialization may reduce the costs of switching tasks (e.g., time lost traveling between
98 Duarte et al.
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task locations or energy costs owing to shifts in behavioral state). Several evolutionary models of
division of labor have investigated the conditions under which a task-specialist strategy is favored
over a task-generalist strategy.
Wakano and coworkers (1998) developed an age polyethism model in which workers were
grouped into different age classes. Each age class allocated labor in predetermined proportions for
inside (e.g., brood care) and outside (foraging) tasks. In a situation in which outside tasks incurred
higher mortality risk and thus worker life expectancy decreased with age, a strict age polyethism
(with young workers specializing in inside tasks and older workers specializing in outside tasks)
was adaptive. Furthermore, environmental ﬂuctuations affected the type of age polyethism that
was optimal: When large ﬂuctuations alter the efﬁciency of both inside and outside workers, a
smooth transition from performing inside to outside tasks is optimal. When ﬂuctuations affected
only foraging, a sharp transition was favored.
Several other models have been proposed to explain division of labor in systems other than
social insects. Wahl (2002) formulated simple game-theory models to study division of labor in
coviruses, in which different types of virions coinfect a host cell and perform complementary
tasks in the replication process (Nee 1987). In these models, phenotypes were ﬁxed: Individuals
could either perform only one of the tasks (specialists) or have the ability to perform all tasks
(generalists). If all tasks were performed, individuals shared the resulting beneﬁts. Wahl made
two types of assumptions concerning the costs associated with task performance. She found that
when costs were paid mainly for the ability to perform a task (ﬁxed costs), rather than for the
performance itself (marginal costs), the outcome was a polymorphic population of specialists, i.e.,
individuals who could perform complementary tasks. When costs were paid for task performance
only, a combination of generalists and specialists for one task was optimal.
Although Wahl’s models were inspired by a different context, some parallels to social insects
can be drawn. In social insects we could consider as ﬁxed the costs involved in developing particular
morphological or physiological structures, or the costs involved in switching tasks. These are costs
that individuals pay for the ability to perform a task. Marginal costs would be, for example, the
energy expenditure involved in task performance. From Wahl’s results, one could thus predict
that separate groups of specialists should frequently evolve when ﬁxed costs are involved, such as
the costs of developing features such as strong mandibles or storage organs.
Another model for studying the adaptive value of specialization takes inspiration from enzyme-
substrate reactions. Tannenbaum (2007) compared the productivity of systems in which binding
and processing a resource to release a ﬁnal product could be performed through an undifferentiated
pathway (generalist strategy) or a differentiated pathway (specialist strategy). For a low density
of agents, undifferentiated pathways were favored owing to the costs of transferring products
between specialists. In a resource-limited regime, a differentiated pathway was more productive
than an undifferentiated pathway when the specialist enzymes were more efﬁcient at binding
to the incoming resource and process intermediate. When resource availability was high, the
differentiated pathway became more productive when it could process faster the molecules to
which agents were bound. These results are quite intuitive because at low densities, transferring
the products of tasks among specialists becomes less efﬁcient, and hence division of labor is selected
against. In social insects this should translate into less marked division of labor in smaller colonies,
as indeed seems to be the case (Thomas & Elgar 2003).
Limitations of Current Evolutionary Models
The main limitation of current evolutionary models is that they tend to ignore the mechanisms
through which specialization may arise. Using a ﬁxed set of strategies, these models use ﬁtness and
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productivitymeasures to test when specialization is better than a generalist strategy.Much like self-
organization models implicitly assume evolutionary adaptation, evolutionary models assume that
somemechanism will evolve that allows for adaptive behavior. The ability to evolve specialization,
however, may be strongly dependent on the mechanism through which it arises. Furthermore, the
analysis of only a ﬁxed set of strategies is limiting. A better approach would be to allow the set of
strategies to evolve itself, thereby alleviating the constraints on adaptive evolution.
Specialization is the crucial deﬁning property of division of labor. Evolutionary models are
usually based on the (plausible) assumption that worker specialization enhances the productivity
of a colony because of synergistic effects. However, surprisingly little information is available on
how specialization increases productivity. Moreover, the information available does not suggest a
close correlation between individual efﬁciency in task performance and specialization (Dornhaus
2008, Muscedere et al. 2009).
UNIFICATION OF SELF-ORGANIZATION
AND EVOLUTIONARY MODELS
In our view, self-organization and evolutionary models are not contradictory in any way, and in
fact they can (and should) be integrated into a common framework.Oneway to do this is illustrated
in Figure 2. The ﬁgure shows that it is useful to distinguish between two timescales: a short-term
Allele frequencies
Genes
Development
Productivity
Behavioral rules Division of labor
Environment
Ev
ol
ut
io
n
Se
lf-
or
ga
ni
za
ti
on
Population
Individual Colony
Fitness differences
Figure 2
Integration of self-organization and evolution in a coherent framework. On a short-term timescale,
self-organization takes place. The factors inﬂuencing task choice at the individual level (i.e., genetics,
development, and environment—abiotic and biotic, including social interactions) interact to produce the
individual phenotype, the rules through which individuals self-organize to divide labor. The colony’s
behavior, and its interaction with the environment, has an effect on productivity and hence on ﬁtness. On the
long-term timescale, natural selection acts on the existing variation in ﬁtness at the population level, thereby
changing allelic frequencies of the genes underlying the rules for self-organized behavior.
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timescale at which interactions take place (corresponding to the life of a colony) and a long-term
timescale at which evolutionary changes occur (Figure 2). On the short-term timescale, self-
organized division of labor emerges as a result of the behavior of individuals, who obey inherited
behavioral rules. Division of labor then has a direct relationship with productivity of a colony
and ﬁtness (number of reproductives). On the long-term timescale, ﬁtness differences between
colonies lead to a change in allele frequencies and hence in the genetic makeup of individuals,
eventually changing the rules underlying division of labor.
A ﬁrst approach is to consider various task choice algorithms, implement a measure of colony
ﬁtness, and allow for selection among the algorithms. A good example of this approach is themodel
of Waibel et al. (2006). They implemented a task allocation model in which colony performance
increased with the number of workers engaged in each task. Different task choice algorithms
were studied, and their underlying genes were allowed to evolve under different conditions of
intracolonial genetic relatedness and environmental perturbations. Under environmental pertur-
bations and high relatedness, a more ﬂexible algorithm that took both individual preferences and
the behavior of colony members into account performed best. Unfortunately, the implications
of this model for division of labor cannot be evaluated because individual levels of specialization
were not reported.
In a similar study, Tarapore et al. (2009) implemented an evolutionary version of the ﬁxed
response threshold model in which thresholds were allowed to evolve in order to study the genetic
architecture and mating system in a task allocation scenario. Individuals could perform a foraging
task and a regulatory task; ﬁtness beneﬁts from the foraging task accrued only when the regulatory
task was within certain bounds. The colonies achieving the highest performance in each gener-
ation contributed to the next generation in proportion to their ﬁtness. The results of this study
indicate that variation in thresholds is a main determinant of colony productivity. Hence, colony
performance was inﬂuenced by the number of males queens mated with as well as the number of
loci encoding the response thresholds.
A. Duarte, I. Pen, L. Keller & F.J.Weissing (submitted) also implemented an evolutionary ver-
sion of the ﬁxed response threshold model in which the evolutionary trajectories of the thresholds
were explicitly followed. The model studied the effect of the evolution of thresholds on division
of labor, colony ﬁtness, and work distribution. This study demonstrated that specialization could
evolve if switching among tasks involved high costs. If this was the case, a previously homogeneous
population evolved to a multimodal distribution of thresholds (via evolutionary branching), and
differentiation of thresholds allowed for division of labor. However, only colonies with a correct
combination of thresholds exhibited pronounced specialization. The branching of thresholds also
can be interpreted as the evolution of separate morphological castes in which individuals of a
caste behave as specialists if enough individuals of the other caste are present, as also observed in
empirical data (Wilson 1985).
The above models are limited because they take an existing self-organization model (similar
to the response threshold model) as their point of departure. This imposes limitations upon
the mechanisms that can potentially evolve and therefore constrains the path of evolution. For
example, in themodel byTarapore et al. (2009), individuals generally evolved low thresholds for the
regulatory task, whereas thresholds for the foraging task were highly variable among individuals.
Hence, when the stimulus for the regulatory task was low, workers with a high threshold for the
foraging task remained idle. Thus, colony efﬁciency was constrained by the inability to evolve
thresholds that minimize idleness for a given task independent of the stimulus level for the other
task. Similarly, A. Duarte, I. Pen, L. Keller & F.J. Weissing (submitted) noticed that the standard
implementation of the ﬁxed threshold model always leads to a uniform distribution of workers
over tasks, even if a skewed distribution is more adaptive. In fact, the distribution of workers over
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Behavior 1
Output
layer
Weights
Weights
Input
layer
Hidden
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Behavior 2 Behavior 3
Stimulus A Stimulus B Stimulus C
Figure 3
Example of a simple feed-forward neural network. Environmental stimuli are perceived by neurons at the
input layer and passed on as signals to the hidden layer, where they are further transformed. Finally, the
signal reaches the output neurons, where a decision is made regarding which task to perform. The network
has many parameters, such as connection weights (arrows), that can be positive or negative and inﬂuence the
strength of the signal. These parameters are allowed to evolve.
tasks was largely independent of the location of the thresholds; it instead was determined by the
parameters governing the stimulus dynamics.
A possible way to circumvent the limitations of a priori mechanisms is to investigate the evolu-
tion of more ﬂexible task choice mechanisms. One interesting option is neural network modeling,
which is applied regularly in evolutionary robotics and has offered interesting insights into the
evolution of behavioral strategies such as communication and cooperation (Floreano & Keller
2010; Floreano et al. 2007; Mitri et al. 2009, 2011; Perez-Uribe et al. 2003). Neural networks can
be used to simulate the processing of stimuli by an individual through receptor cells connected to
output cells controlling behavioral responses (Figure 3) (Ghirlanda&Enquist 1998). Even for rel-
atively small neuronal networks, the number of potential stimulus-response patterns (which form
the substrate for evolution) is almost limitless. All kinds of behavioral architectures can evolve,
whereas in traditional models the behavioral bauplan is determined by the modeler a priori. On
the downside, the evolution of neural networks is not always efﬁcient, because ﬁtness optima must
be found in a high-dimensional trait space. Moreover, the interpretation of the functioning of an
evolved network is not always straightforward.
Two recent studies apply networkmodeling to the evolution of self-organized division of labor.
P. Lichocki, D. Tarapore, L. Keller & D. Floreano (submitted) considered a network version of
Tarapore et al.’s (2009) model for combining a foraging and a regulatory task. They showed that
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the efﬁciency of task allocation and overall colony productivity were greatly improved when a
simple neural network controlled individual decisions. In the evolved networks, the link between
the stimulus for one task and the likelihood of performing the other task was partly decoupled. As
a result, fewer workers were idle, which led to higher colony efﬁciency.
In the same vein, in the model of A. Duarte, E. Scholtens & F.J. Weissing (submitted), a
neural network approach allowed for worker distribution over tasks to be more ﬂexible than in
the ﬁxed response threshold model. This study also investigated a slightly more complex network
that allows past experience to affect individual behavior. Specialization mediated by individual
experience evolves easily when switching tasks bears costs to the colony.
Benchmarks of Evolved Mechanisms Underlying Division of Labor
In this section we highlight some desirable features that a unifying model for the evolution of self-
organized division of labor should include. We discuss these features in light of existing models
and suggest future avenues of research.
Emergent specialization and adaptive distribution of workers. Because emergent specializa-
tion at the individual level is the most obvious property of division of labor, we are interested in
those systems in which selection favors the establishment of specialization. Specialization may be
selected directly, if it brings an immediate advantage, or indirectly, if the behavioral rules leading
to specialization are selected owing to other beneﬁcial consequences.
Specialization is easy to obtain in self-organizationmodels, but it may be unstable when studied
from an evolutionary perspective. For example, in the model of A. Duarte, I. Pen, L. Keller &
F.J. Weissing (submitted), selection for maximum colony performance often drives thresholds to
zero level. As a result, specialization vanishes, even if it is beneﬁcial for colony productivity.
For the proper functioning of the colony as a whole, an evolvedmechanism for division of labor
should produce an adaptive distribution of workers over tasks. As shown by A. Duarte, I. Pen,
L. Keller & F.J. Weissing (submitted), the standard version of the response threshold model
does not have this property, because it always leads to a uniform distribution of workers over
tasks. Hence, a more sophisticated modeling setup is required (such as neural network modeling;
A. Duarte, E. Scholtens & F.J. Weissing, submitted) to enable the evolution of an asymmetric
distribution in which some tasks are performed by a larger proportion of workers whereas other
tasks require fewer individuals.
Flexibility and developmental robustness. Any realistic model for the evolution of division of
labor should allow for ﬂexibility in colony behavior, that is, the ability to cope with environmental
challenges necessitating a change in the distribution of workers over tasks. Thus far, only the
interaction model of Pacala et al. (1996) addresses such ﬂexibility, but even in this model it is
unclear how workers acquire knowledge about how the proﬁtability of tasks changes over time.
There is an urgent need for models exploring the implications of temporal variation (e.g., seasonal
variation in food abundance).
The ability to cope with environmental challenges necessitates robustness with respect to the
internal state of the colony. An adequate timing of task performance and an optimal distribution
of workers over tasks should be attained irrespective of factors such as within-colony genetic vari-
ability, colony demographic structure, or the developmental dynamics of a colony (see Tarapore
et al. 2009). Developmental plasticity that allows the generation of phenotypic diversity in colonies
with low genetic diversity has not yet received the attention it deserves.
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Evolutionary attainability and stability. It is now well established that in social evolution seem-
ingly favorable traits (such as a mechanism that generates division of labor) are not necessarily
attainable because selection may drive a population away from these solutions (Garden of Eden
scenarios; Nowak 1990). Even if a seemingly favorable trait is attained, it is not necessarily evolu-
tionarily stable (Maynard Smith 1982). Examples of inaccessible or evolutionarily unstable traits
abound in situations with evolutionary conﬂicts or counteracting selection at different levels of
organization (McNamara &Weissing 2010). Both factors are relevant in colonies of social insects.
Members of a colony may have conﬂicting interests regarding caste fate of female brood,
relative colony investment in males and females, and worker reproduction (reviewed in Ratnieks
et al. 2006). Conﬂict over sex allocation may lead to a tug-of-war between queens and workers
in which each party attempts to bias the colony sex ratio toward its optimum (Pen & Taylor
2005, Reuter & Keller 2001, Reuter et al. 2004). For example, workers may bias the sex ratio by
killing males (e.g., Sundstro¨m et al. 1996) or increase the proportion of diploid individuals raised
as reproductive females (e.g., Hammond et al. 2002). Queens, in return, may limit the number
of available eggs to prevent workers from eliminating males (e.g., Passera et al. 2001). These
mechanisms of sex-ratio manipulation by queens and workers are likely to incur costs because
of suboptimal investment in workers and/or waste of resources already invested in the males
eliminated (Helms et al. 2005, Reuter et al. 2004). Theory also suggests that female larvae are
in conﬂict with both queens and workers regarding their caste fate, and when in control of their
development, a high proportion of female larvae should develop into reproductive females instead
of sterile workers (Bourke & Ratnieks 1999, Ratnieks 2001, Reuter & Keller 2001, Wenseleers
et al. 2003).
Because within-colony conﬂicts can decrease the number of active workers within a colony
and change the ratios of worker castes when different types of workers vary in their likelihood to
reproduce (Bourke & Franks 1995), these conﬂicts may reduce the evolutionary attainability and
stability of division of labor. Thus far, models integrating self-organization and evolution have
not dealt with selection at multiple levels; this is a point to address in future work.
Challenges
We end this review with a brief discussion of three aspects of models for the evolution of division
of labor that we ﬁnd particularly challenging.
Fitness. Empirically, little is known about how division of labor affects colony ﬁtness. The re-
lationship between ergonomic efﬁciency and ﬁtness was one of the basic open questions pointed
out by Oster & Wilson (1978) in their book Caste and Ecology in the Social Insects. Thirty years
later, little progress has been made. Current models use proxies for ﬁtness such as the overall work
performed and the distribution of workers over tasks. Although these features are undoubtedly
related to colony survival, growth, and productivity, they do not necessarily have a simple and
straightforward relationship with colony ﬁtness. In fact, predictions based on such components
of ﬁtness (rather than on overall ﬁtness) can be highly misleading (e.g., McNamara & Weissing
2010). In the context of division of labor, it remains a challenge to develop more realistic ap-
proximations of the relationship between ﬁtness and task performance, such as the number of
reproductive individuals produced by a colony as well as their reproductive values.
Realism of biological details. In the vast majority of models of division of labor, information
on task needs is global. However, owing to the spatial distribution of tasks, all group members
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are unlikely to have the same information. In a more realistic setting, information on task needs
should be local; group members should transmit information with some noise and cost.
Importantly, concerning the realism of evolutionary parameters, scientists working on self-
organized processes at the colony level or evolutionary processes overmany generations frequently
have different backgrounds (e.g., mathematics, physics, computer science, and engineering for
self-organization models and evolutionary biology for ultimate questions) and hence use different
approaches. For example, Tarapore et al. (2009) and A. Duarte, I. Pen, L. Keller & F.J. Weissing
(submitted) use a high mutation rate, strong selection, and few generations to minimize compu-
tation time. These authors follow the example of artiﬁcial intelligence studies in which the goal is
to develop fast solutions for highly complex systems in which several dynamic processes co-occur.
From the engineering perspective of such studies, it makes sense to set parameters such as muta-
tion rates or recombination probabilities to values that enhance the efﬁciency of the evolutionary
algorithms. In contrast, evolutionary biologists are facing systems with externally given parame-
ters, which may have less desirable properties. It remains to be seen how strongly evolutionary
conclusions are dependent on the parameter settings used in simulations.
Comparison of division of labor in different models. Thus far we have treated division of
labor as a concept that overlaps with specialization. However, it is desirable to distinguish between
individual specialization, which is a property of the individual, and division of labor, which is a
property of the group (Gorelick et al. 2004). To better compare differentmodels, a standardization
of the measures used for quantifying specialization and division of labor would be desirable.
Specialization has been quantiﬁed as the frequency of task performance (Bonabeau et al. 1996)
by estimating the proportion of time individuals do speciﬁc tasks. This measure, however, does not
take into account the pattern of task choice. An individual switching randomly between two tasks
and another switching only once during the observed period can achieve the same value of task
frequency: They both spend half their time doing one task and the other half doing the other task.
Another measure of specialization that is based on the probability of individuals to switch among
tasks (Gautrais et al. 2002) produces a much higher value of specialization for the individual that
switched tasks only once than for the individual that switched randomly between tasks.
Individual specialization is only part of the story, because we can talk about division of labor
only if individuals are specialized in different tasks. Gorelick & Bertram (2007) suggested several
matrix statistics, taking into consideration information on both tasks and individuals, which are
useful measures of the nestedness of task choice (i.e., how restricted certain individuals are to
certain tasks and vice versa). These statistics, however, do not account for the distribution of
workers over tasks. To cope with the fact that each measure on its own offers only an incomplete
picture of a model’s behavior, it is perhaps necessary to include different measures, including a
description of specialization at the individual level, a nestedness measure of tasks and individuals,
and an overall task performance ratio.
CONCLUSION
Uniﬁcation of evolution and self-organization will certainly enlighten us on what kind of mecha-
nisms can evolve.However, empirically, little is still known about individual differences in behavior
within colonies and the proximate mechanisms underlying the propensity of an individual to en-
gage in a given task. The main obstacle to opening this black box lies in the difﬁculty of tracking
individuals within colonies and manipulating their environment. Fortunately, new studies using
radio tagging and ﬁduciary markers have begun to provide insights on the factors affecting the
behavior of individuals within colonies and how, in turn, this inﬂuences interactions at the colony
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level. The combination of such behavioral analyses with new genomic tools applicable to a wide
range of social insects (Graff et al. 2007, Grozinger et al. 2007, Smith et al. 2010, Wurm et al.
2010) should provide insights into howgenetic differences and social interactions interact to jointly
affect individual behavior and patterns of division of labor at the colony level.
Self-organizationmodels and evolutionarymodels are two sides of the same coin. On one hand,
we must understand the behavioral rules on which self-organization is based; on the other hand, a
full understanding of division of labor must encompass the evolutionary trajectories of such rules.
We hope that this review encourages more studies including both perspectives in their research
agendas.
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